Conflict, Deforestation, and Mining in South Kivu, DRC

I. Executive Summary

South Kivu, in the mineral-rich eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, exemplifies the mutually reinforcing relationship between environmental degradation and violent conflict. In 2013, the province lost 46.8¹ kha of tree cover– a fivefold increase from the previous year– while conflict events surged from just 6 to 270 by 2024, a sobering 4,400% rise that underscores its spiraling instability.

In 2025, over 7,000² people have been killed across the eastern DRC as the Alliance Fleuve Congo³ (AFC) and its armed wing, the Rwanda Defence Force-backed⁴ M23 rebel group, seized⁵ Goma in late January and Bukavu in early February. These advances portend intensifying resource-driven violence among the state, civilians, and nearly 120⁶ armed groups in South Kivu.

While the AFC’s ambitions extend beyond⁷ mineral control, competition over the DRC’s $24 trillion⁸ in “conflict minerals”⁹ has fueled nearly three decades¹⁰ of violence in the east. Demand for tin, tantalum, tungsten (the “3Ts”¹¹), and gold has surged due to their critical role in consumer electronics, electric vehicles, and renewable energy storage. China, the EU, and the United States remain the largest importers, with multinational corporations dependent¹² on Congolese supply chains despite persistent human rights and environmental concerns. As demand for lithium-ion batteries and semiconductor components accelerates¹³ due to artificial intelligence advances, so too do incentives for armed groups to violently contest mining areas. This conflict, in turn, drives¹⁴ deforestation in the Congo Basin, the world’s second-largest rainforest and a critical carbon sink¹⁵ absorbing 10% of global emissions.

The capital Kinshasa, 1,500 km west of South Kivu, struggles to govern the province amid severe logistical constraints. Without¹⁶ railway infrastructure, troops and supplies must travel on poor roads often impassable during rainy seasons¹⁷. Weak regulatory oversight in gold¹⁸ and timber¹⁹ production enables local officials, the Congolese army (FARDC), and militias to siphon state revenues, fostering parallel economies that systematically undermine²⁰ governance²¹. Along the eastern border with Rwanda and Burundi, dense mountainous forests conceal militant movements, while short cross-border supply chains facilitate armed group operations. Enabled by systemic corruption and weak state authority, South Kivu remains enmeshed in a cycle of violence and resource exploitation with global ramifications.

Key Trends:

1. Roads drive both conflict and deforestation. The highest environmental and humanitarian costs arise where roads link population centers to mining and logging sites.
2. Mines are focal points of violence. Conflict risk is highest within 5 km of road-connected mines, where resources are laundered, oversight is evaded, and armed groups contest control.
3. Degradation and conflict follow distinct patterns. Illegal, heavily²² informal resource extraction occurs across the province, while conflict remains concentrated along eastern road networks, shifting westward over time.

Addressing any one of these issues in isolation– whether through conservation, counterinsurgency, or economic regulation– invites failure. The Congolese government can take three evidence-backed actions to alleviate conflict and environmental pressure in South Kivu:

1. Expand Itombwe Nature Reserve to include Lulenge, Fizi. Protected Areas²³ can reduce both²⁴ deforestation and conflict, even amid heightened violence. Basimunyaka Sud, a Lulenge collectivity near two gold mines, accounted for 5% of the province’s total conflict events. Given its proximity, Itombwe is the most viable expansion site.
2. Financially incentivize forest monitoring through community-based forest management²⁵ and REDD+²⁶. Expand training for local communities in monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) practices in existing REDD+ forests, ensuring transparent profit-sharing mechanisms.
3. Revamp artisanal gold mining (ASGM) due diligence programs. Strengthen traceability initiatives like the ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism²⁷ and promote closed-pipe supply chains²⁸ that connect artisanal miners directly to legal markets, reducing illicit rent-seeking and armed group financing.

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II. Background: DRC Recent Conflict History

The DRC has endured decades of persistent²⁹ violence abetted by its neighbors, seeking ethnic predominance and resource control. Spurred³⁰ by alliances and rivalries that traverse national borders, violence in the DRC frequently invites cross-border operations by foreign groups. In the wake of mass displacement into the eastern DRC (then Zaire) following the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front’s (RPF) halting of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the First Congo War (1996-7) erupted³¹ when the Rwandan- and Ugandan-backed AFDL rebelled against Zairean president Mobutu Sese Seko. Seko’s successor, AFDL leader Laurent Kabila, failed to consolidate popular support while alienating both Rwanda and Uganda, his former backers, with short-sighted entreaties to the Hutu-led Interahamwe and Omar al-Bashir’s Sudan, respectively. One major outcome of this ethnically driven tension was the persecution of the Banyamulenge³² and other ethnic groups labeled by Seko and Kabila as “non-Congolese,” who have endured ongoing violence from both domestic and foreign armed groups. The ensuing Second Congo War (1998-2003), often referred to as “Africa’s World War” due to the involvement of nine countries and 25 armed groups, resulted in 5.4 million deaths, making it the deadliest conflict since 1945.

Figure 1 – Conflict Events and Mining Activity in South Kivu (2013-2024)

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The Second Congo War exhibited multiple geostrategic dynamics that continue to shape conflict in South Kivu and the eastern DRC broadly. These include: (1) exploitation of informal mining and timber producers by a range of actors, from the Congolese army to non-state militias and state actors acting quasi-legally; (2) the use of resource profits to finance conflict operations; and (3) the Congolese government’s limited ability to project power across challenging terrain and maintain control over remote regions with poor connectivity.

Figures 1 and 2 underscore how each of these three dynamics play out in South Kivu’s restrictive geography.

1. Illicit resource exploitation: With nearly 5,000 3TG mine sites and forests covering 70% of its territory, South Kivu presents abundant opportunities for illicit wealth extraction while evading taxation and regulatory oversight. The broad distribution of natural resources across the province fuels violence in areas where materials, money, and armed groups intersect. Mining areas at persistent risk for violence include:
   1. The Basimunyaka Sud (Fizi) collectivity accounted for 7% of province-wide violence within 5 km; Minembwe village hosts a strategic airstrip that attracts repeated battles between the Mai-Mai/Raia Mutomboki group Makanika and the Burundian rebel group RED-Tabara³³ allied against FARDC elements.
   2. Lulimba/Misisi (Fizi, 2%), contested by Raia Mutomboki coalition CNPSC³⁴ and the loose Banyamulenge alliance of Gutabara, Ngumino, and Twiganeho groups.
   3. Kipupu (Mwenga, 2%), on the rugged border of Mwenga, Uvira, and Fizi, was the site of a 2020 civilian mass killing³⁵ and continued Banyamulenge militia activity.
2. Resource-based conflict financing: The alignment of violence with resource-rich areas rather than population centers highlights the persistent link between illicit resource extraction and conflict in South Kivu. Since 2013, 42% of conflict events have occurred within 5 km of a mining site, whereas only 13% took place within 5 km of the province’s three main population centers: Bukavu, Uvira, and Baraka. Although efforts to improve mineral traceability have progressed³⁶, the province’s numerous artisanal gold mines continue³⁷ to offer both incentives and operational support for armed groups.
3. Geographically-limited government penetration: Road infrastructure in the DRC is sparse and frequently targeted by violence, with 47% of conflict events occurring within 1,000 meters of a road, underscoring their strategic importance in facilitating violence. This pattern also reflects the Congolese state’s limited territorial control, even in relatively developed parts of the province. However, the overall inaccessibility of much of the region allows security efforts to be concentrated on key corridors, such as the N5 northbound between Lulimba and Bukavu and the RN2 running south through Kalehe to Bukavu.

Figure 2 – Conflict Events Over Time, Scaled by Fatalities

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The heightened risk of violence within 5 km of South Kivu’s road-accessible mining areas and transit routes reflects the Congolese state’s ongoing challenges in managing its critical infrastructure. However, these established spatial patterns can help focus security efforts on these proven high-risk zones, enabling limited state forces to concentrate resources more effectively rather than attempting to patrol the entire 65,000 km²³⁸ province.

III. Deforestation Trends in the DRC

Over the past two decades, South Kivu has experienced a steady and expanding pattern of deforestation tied³⁹ to demographic pressures that extensively supports informal economies. Its dense forests are subject to clearing for agriculture, charcoal production, and settlement, with the DRC’s rapidly increasing population projected to more than double⁴⁰ to 218 million by 2050.

One defining aspect of economies driven by forest degradation is the widespread⁴¹ absence of formal oversight, structured organization, coordination, and proper documentation of participant activities by authorities or regulatory institutions. While informal economic activities serve as an essential⁴² source of cash flow, they also create opportunities for extortion and violence by armed groups. This instability exacerbates environmental degradation, leading to cascading ecological consequences such as loss of biodiversity, soil depletion, and disruptions to local livelihoods.

The vast majority of forest disturbance in South Kivu– around 80%⁴³– stems from semi-mechanized, small-scale land clearing for agriculture to support population growth, with two-thirds⁴⁴ of total coverage driven by informal smallholder clearing. These informal deforestation-based economies support the livelihoods of approximately 30 million⁴⁵ people across the country. In this highly diffuse context, armed groups and illicit economies have played a role in deforestation, particularly⁴⁶ through the extraction, transport, and trading of timber and charcoal. For example, the FDLR taxes⁴⁷ civilian access to charcoal production sites and kilns in exchange for protection from forest rangers, occasionally⁴⁸ working in concert with FARDC elements. The evidently complex interplay between actors and extensive grey area maneuvering compound implementation challenges for effective forest monitoring.

Industrial logging accounts for 10% of forest loss, predominantly located in the DRC’s western and central territories where timber can be floated⁴⁹ on the Congo River to the coast for export. This relatively low figure is largely due to the Congolese government’s 2002 moratorium on logging concessions, but that ban’s announced rollback⁵⁰ in 2021 will likely push this share higher in the near future. A 2023 Center for International Forestry Research and World Agroforestry (CIFOR-ICRAF) study found⁵¹ that even formal concessions with transparent Forest Management Plans (FMPs) had no effect on deforestation rates compared to unmanaged control areas. This indicates that logging concessionaires have failed to stem encroachment by informal loggers, miners, and farmers. While initial implementation of sustainability protocols like FMPs for logging areas is a necessary first step to managing deforestation in the Congo Basin, periodically evaluating FMPs’ effectiveness and enhancing best-practices sharing appears central to deriving enduring environmental benefit from managed concessions.

With 85%⁵² of South Kivan timber destined for export, most of its production must be sawed in order to be transported across hundreds of kilometers of harsh road conditions. Long stretches of isolated cross-border roads provide numerous opportunities for militias or state actors to establish roadblocks and extort passersby, while regulatory loopholes enable producers to skirt the four⁵³ major national, provincial, and local timber taxes by mis-declaring timber species, underreporting official waybills, or through outright bribery. A 2023 study found⁵⁴ 57 undeclared, untaxed, unverified cubic meters of timber were transported for every 100 cubic meters of over-the-table timber across the eastern DRC. Highlighting the ingenuity of the region’s illicit timber trade, shipments evaded 82%⁵⁵ of official duties. With a conservatively estimated 100,000 cubic meters of timber exported from eastern DRC annually, timber tax avoidance in the eastern DRC could be costing the Congolese state $310 million each year. A plausible policy intervention to improve revenue capture is the establishing of timber parks⁵⁶– mandatory border crossings for timber exports– along South Kivu’s eastern border.

The highly unregulated nature of deforestation in South Kivu is primarily driven by smallholder agricultural expansion, which despite little⁵⁷ international attention accounts for the vast majority of forest loss. The decentralized and informal nature of these activities makes enforcement particularly challenging, as land clearing occurs on an individual basis rather than through large-scale organized efforts. Weak governance, limited institutional capacity, and the presence of armed groups further complicate regulatory oversight, enabling unchecked forest exploitation for timber and charcoal extraction. In the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms, deforestation will likely persist unabated, leading to long-term ecological degradation, soil depletion, and increased global vulnerability to climate change.

Sub-Provincial Variation in Forest Loss

Figure 3 reveals substantial variation in forest loss trends across South Kivu’s territories, each showing significantly increased rates of forest cover loss beginning in 2013. Province-wide, South Kivu has averaged over 1 million⁵⁸ ha of forest loss per year, peaking between 2016 and 2018, with degradation patterns heavily mapping⁵⁹ to areas of significant population growth.

Figure 3 – Annual Forest Loss by Territory in South Kivu (2000-2024)

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Kalehe and Shabunda in particular show the mutually sharp yet distinct increases in deforestation associated with general urbanization and specific mining activities, respectively. Deforestation in Kalehe (62%⁶⁰ forest cover), which directly abuts⁶¹ North and South Kivu population centers and road networks, is largely driven via an increase in population center outgrowth and attendant need for agricultural land. In contrast, Shabunda (97%⁶² cover)– the most remote and least connected territory in South Kivu– experiences forest loss driven by targeted resource extraction of timber, 3T, and gold.

Smaller and less forested territories like Idjwi (2.3%⁶³ forest cover) and Walungu (20%⁶⁴ cover) display consistently lower levels of loss, suggesting forest loss increases in proportion with a territory’s forest cover. Uvira (26%⁶⁵ cover) demonstrates notable volatility, with human-related land use in the territory increasing nearly 5%⁶⁶ between 1995-2021. The culmination of this upwards-trending degradation corresponds with Uvira city gaining⁶⁷ official city status in 2018, and appears to persist despite a temporary halt due to the territory’s extensive⁶⁸ flooding in 2020. Province-wide, forest loss trends indicate the widespread phenomenon of informal clearing that inordinately drives deforestation, with persistent spikes reflecting corresponding population growth.

The role of non-elite local actors

Local communities in South Kivu are not passive actors in the cycle of deforestation and conflict; they are both affected by and, due to limited economic opportunities, active participants in resource extraction and land conversion. REDD+⁶⁹ (reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries) activities, a UN-backed carbon credit program incentivizing⁷⁰ monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) of forest changes in alignment with national forest management strategies, provide a well-tested⁷¹ avenue to both reduce forest loss as well as financial alternatives to subsistence activities. REDD+ projects require extensive on-the-ground field measurement and monitoring, which local communities can be trained⁷² to perform via paid community-based monitoring (CBM). With external support for analyzing community data, REDD+ activities create a parallel set of incentives, relatively insulated from interference or extortion, that align individual and community self-interest with broader sustainable practices. Regardless of program, effective intervention strategies must recognize the agency of local populations and support sustainable alternatives that align conservation efforts with economic survival, rather than relying solely on top-down enforcement measures that risk criminalizing subsistence activities.

Figure 4 – Coincidence of Conflict & Deforestation in South Kivu

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Key Deforestation Zones

Figure 4 highlights the coincidence of violent conflict and deforestation in the province since 2013. “High-High” areas are heavily concentrated near roadways, reflecting the province’s difficult terrain and limited infrastructure. Lighter-coded hexes chiefly show areas presently inaccessible to large-scale human movement and isolated from infrastructure, demonstrating the sheer ruggedness of much of South Kivu’s geography.

“High-High” areas illustrate the intense interactions between violence and forest loss. In Figure 5, Minova (top), a trading hub in Kalehe territory on Lake Kivu, saw its population swell as over 300,000⁷³ IDPs fled M23’s advance in North Kivu beginning in March 2022. By January 2025⁷⁴, the town’s road link to Goma via the RN2 was severed⁷⁵, forcing residents to depend on Lake Kivu for essentials. These disruptions are evident in Figure 5 (top left), where forest loss follows the expansion of informal IDP settlements and increased activity along the lakeshore.

Numbi (second), a mining town less than 20 km from Minova, exhibits a more contained pattern of deforestation, with clearings branching off a central roadway. Artisanal mining operations, though limited in direct forest clearance, drive substantial indirect deforestation– up to 28 times more– through settlement expansion, agricultural land clearing, and other secondary land uses.

Mukera (third), in Fizi Territory, reflects the impact of the DRC’s 2021 industrial logging ban reversal⁷⁶, with clear-cutting concentrated along two road networks and a third roadway under construction. The abrupt transition between forested and deforested areas suggests mechanized logging operations.

Mulongwe Refugee Camp (bottom), also in Fizi, demonstrates the environmental toll of displacement. Established in November 2017 to shelter 5,000 Burundian refugees, the camp’s rapid expansion coincides with significant forest loss, as dense settlement patterns and spillover land use contribute to surrounding degradation.

Figure 5 – Patterns of Forest Loss in South Kivu

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Looking Forward

The province-wide panel (see Figure 3) underscores that South Kivu as a whole has experienced a steep rise in forest loss since the early 2010s, with the total deforested area more than doubling over two decades. The slight decline in recent years may indicate partial stabilization, although levels remain significantly elevated compared to the early 2000s. This broader trend suggests that while some territories may experience localized recovery or slowing loss, the overall trajectory points to sustained pressure on forest resources. Since forest loss is intimately tied to population growth in the DRC, this trend is likely to continue, with the country’s population on pace to more than double⁷⁷ by 2050. One promising national intervention may be expanding protected area status to more forests, a status that reduced⁷⁸ forest loss even amid increased conflict. Designating protected areas for forest conservation even where institutional strength is low appears to be a rare instance in which national legislation has palpable ground-level effects on both environmental degradation and violent conflict. Again, expanding legislative protections while empowering⁷⁹ local communities in monitoring roles promotes⁸⁰ follow-through and broad participation. Combined with localized REDD+ or similar activities that establish parallel incentives for individuals and communities to supplement income through conservation-aligned activities, these policies are highly cost-effective alternatives to conventional state oversight.

IV. Conflict & Mining In the Eastern DRC: Drivers & Recent Trends

South Kivu and the eastern DRC is one of the world’s leading⁸¹ suppliers of tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold (3TG), essential minerals for technology, electronics, and industrial applications. The expansion⁸² of semiconductor manufacturing, aerospace engineering, and telecommunications over the past two decades has spurred intense⁸³ demand for these inputs. Tantalum, refined from coltan, and tungsten are critical components in semiconductors and capacitors, tin (cassiterite) is widely used in soldering for circuit boards, and gold, due to its high value and ease of transport, remains⁸⁴ a preferred illicit mineral. Importantly, the DRC’s G4 granite deposits often contain veins of both⁸⁵ gold and 3T minerals, meaning single mining sites can yield a diversified portfolio of resources. M23 reportedly earns over $300,000⁸⁶ per month from its control of neighboring North Kivu’s Rubaya coltan mines, significantly enabling its ability to project consistent power in the eastern DRC.

Profitable opportunities for state actors– principally Ministry of Mines (SAEMAPE⁸⁷) agents– and armed groups continue (mostly⁸⁸ as checkpoints⁸⁹) during resource transit, as minerals are routinely smuggled⁹⁰ out of the eastern DRC through Rwanda or Uganda. From there, 3T minerals continue on to the Northern⁹¹ and Central⁹² Corridors running to Mombasa, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania respectively, for final transit. Malaysia and Thailand import the vast majority⁹³ of official tin exports, with China importing over half of the DRC’s official tungsten and tantalum. Since 2018, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged⁹⁴ as a key destination for gold from the DRC, much of which is smuggled out and falsely certified as domestic exports from Uganda and, more recently, Rwanda.

More localized initiatives, including the ITSCI⁹⁵ Programme, which supports mining companies’ rigorous due diligence of mineral supply chains, have demonstrated more success in stewarding responsible production of 3T minerals. ITSCI claims to verify around 95%⁹⁶ of 3T exports in the Great Lakes Region, meaning it monitors and certifies that 3T supply chains meet OECD standards for human rights, worker fairness, and absence of armed group interference. These supply-side interventions coincided with a substantial reduction in armed group presence at 3T mining sites, absent from 79%⁹⁷ of 3T sites visited by IPIS researchers between 2015-2020. This figure is a marked improvement in transparency from previous data in 2008, when 3T minerals contributed some $134.4M⁹⁸ to armed groups in the DRC. Such transparency practically⁹⁹ results in increased tax revenue for the DRC for minerals that might have been smuggled and fraudulently exported by its neighbors.

However, ITSCI’s system has received¹⁰⁰ criticism for allowing production from unverified mines, including those occupied by militias or employing child labor, to enter its supply chain. Around Nzibira (Walungu), a 2021 Global Witness study found less than 20%¹⁰¹ of 3T minerals tagged originated from validated mines free of worker exploitation. This suggests that tagged minerals are fraudulently attributed to less-productive verified mines on a systemic scale, thoroughly undercutting ITSCI’s mission. The fact ITSCI revenue is tied to levies on tagged minerals creates conflicts of interest that appear to have knowingly enabled mineral laundering under their regulatory aegis. Addressing this incentive structure, whether by altering ITSCI governance or establishing an new independent due diligence body, is critical for fostering supply chain integrity, which in turn undercuts armed group financing and human rights violations.

These policies have resulted in changing strategies among armed groups, state actors, and miners operating in the eastern DRC, mainly a shift¹⁰² toward less-regulated gold exploitation. While the former’s presence at 3T mines engaged in due diligence has decreased, the locus of violence has diffused to surrounding areas. The Congolese government’s attempts to formalize its mining concessions in the 2010s also created a quasi-legal grey area in which underpaid state agents were able to translate influence into rent-collecting activities around mining operations. These shifts have collectively contributed to a more fragmented and faceted mining landscape, where regulatory efforts have struggled to curb the persistence of informal economies and armed interference.

Large-Scale vs. Artisanal-Scale Mining

Minerals in the DRC are extracted in two parallel¹⁰³ systems, each with its unique externalities: large-scale, or commercial mining (LSM) and artisanal, small-scale mining (ASM).

This dual system is further complicated by legal and taxation structures that favor large-scale operators, often to the detriment of the DRC’s economic interests. Despite the 2018¹⁰⁴ Mining Code’s efforts to secure higher royalties and greater local participation in large-scale mining, the excessively lenient¹⁰⁵ provisions of the 2002¹⁰⁶ Code—marked by low royalties, long-term permits, and minimal state oversight—have cemented a deeply asymmetrical system of resource extraction, where vast wealth flows out while the DRC sees limited returns. For example, the Sicomines¹⁰⁷ agreement, a 2008 resources-for-infrastructure deal with a Chinese consortium, failed to invest $616 million¹⁰⁸ of the $1.16 billion pledged to Congolese infrastructure in exchange for copper and cobalt rights in the country’s southwest. While the DRC renegotiated¹⁰⁹ for an ostensibly larger $7 billion infrastructure package in January 2024, serious questions remain about the state’s capacity to enforce transparent investment, manage environmental costs, and sustainably steward capital influxes. Beyond exploitative economics, foreign LSM firms profit while dumping industrial waste, leaving locals to cope with long-term environmental damage– an enduring legacy of resource extraction¹¹⁰ systems that enrich foreign economies far more than they benefit the Congolese people.

Figure 6 – Northern & Central Corridors, East Africa

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In contrast, artisanal (ASM) mining has received little legislative attention since initial legalization¹¹¹ in the early 1980s, despite employing an estimated two million¹¹² people in the DRC and accounting for 10–20%¹¹³ of the country’s mineral extraction. While large-scale mining firms control the most resource-rich sites, smaller or more remote deposits often fall under artisanal operations, which rely on manual labor and hand tools. Compared to large-scale mining, ASM mining faces greater¹¹⁴ challenges from both government regulation and governance failures. A lack of state-provided training and financing, weak health, security, and environmental protections, and limited legal recourse leave artisanal miners vulnerable to exploitation by armed groups. Efforts¹¹⁵ in the early 2010s¹¹⁶ to integrate ASM mining into formal industry structures through oversight and higher taxation failed, preventing two million miners from accessing more stable and profitable employment. As a result, despite official zoning distinctions, artisanal mining frequently takes place on large-scale mining concessions without oversight, protections, or transparency for workers or their product.

Gold, in particular, bypasses¹¹⁷ many regulatory frameworks due to its high portability and fungibility, making it the preferred¹¹⁸ source of funding for militias operating in South Kivu. Compared to 3T minerals exported by the ton, small quantities of artisanal-mined gold (ASGM) can be carried by individuals along a supply chain, and at nearly 2,900 USD per ounce, remain extremely lucrative. Since gold is near-universally accepted as currency, especially in mining areas, supply chains from particular sites are quickly fractured and almost impossible to track, allowing actors to trade off-grid and avoid regulatory scrutiny.

Alongside traceability concerns, ASGM supply chains in the eastern DRC are more¹¹⁹ vertically integrated than their 3T counterparts, allowing a small number of influential actors to circumvent some 46¹²⁰ taxes associated with formal ASGM mining and offer up to 98% of the LBMA international spot price, compared to the 80-85% available to formal actors. In this context, both miners and local traders are disincentivized from formalizing their ASGM activities, which remain highly informal and subject to official corruption, armed group taxation, and cross-border smuggling.

ASGM sites in the eastern DRC employ some 286,000 workers earning between $2.70 and 3.30 per day, compared to 76% of the DRC’s total population living on less than $1.90 per day. Compared to ITSCI’s 95% verification rate for 3T mines, less than 5%¹²¹ of eastern DRC artisanal gold mines receive regular inspection, with the vast majority of artisanal gold mining occurring on unregistered sites. Consequently, over 95%¹²² of ASM-extracted gold from the eastern DRC exits the country unreported and thus untaxed, preventing governance and quality of life improvements that indirect taxation of minerals might otherwise fuel: an estimated $13.7 million¹²³ per year in export taxes alone.

Applying the same transparency practices that have successfully reduced conflict financing by 3T sites to ASGM sites must be prioritized to increase state revenue capture and root out the glaring ASGM regulatory loophole in the DRC’s mining sector.

Contrasting Conflict Dynamics: Kibaran vs. Panafrican Gold Province

Armed groups contest two major mineral deposits in South Kivu with radically different effects on the civilian population (see Figure 6). In Shabunda, the “Kibaran Gold Province”¹²⁴ astride the Karagwe-Ankole Belt is the DRC’s most prominent artisanal gold production region. While international companies like Banro and Vector Resources control main gold deposits, the area’s reserves support an additional 93,000¹²⁵ artisanal miners across nearly 650 mining and river dredging sites. Despite the wealth of valuable material, only 2% of South Kivu’s violence occurred in Shabunda. This may reflect several factors, its near-total¹²⁶ forest cover and low¹²⁷ population density chief among them. Yet during its gold rush¹²⁸ in the 2010s, Shabunda experienced a highly systematized illicit taxation racket in which Raia Mutomboki communal militias extorted¹²⁹ miners and dredgers along the Ulindi River in direct collaboration with Chinese concessionaire mining company Kun Hou. In exchange for securing concessionaire mining sites, Raia Mutomboki factions received payment from Kun Hou and the ability to additionally tax individual miners’ earnings operating on the Ulindi. Ministry of Mines (SAEMAPE¹³⁰) officials were further complicit in illegal taxation, creating a system in which putative “opponents” are in fact colluding with each other to exploit workers’ labor and skirt regulation.

The Panafrican Gold Province¹³¹, a narrow corridor along the province’s eastern border between Kalehe in the north and Fizi in the south, presents a stark contrast due to its location. This area supports around 45,000¹³² miners on 235 artisanal sites. While less productive than Kibaran, the Panafrican region is far closer to export routes in Rwanda and Uganda, streamlining transportation while circumventing Congolese taxes. However, that same proximity places mining sites and miners under increased conflict pressure: 41% of the province’s violence occurred in the RN5 corridor heading north from Lulimba to Bukavu. As the single road linking the DRC’s southeastern territories with the rest of the country, securing the RN5 northbound Lulimba corridor could relieve pressure on this strategic bottleneck, which currently benefits armed groups. The starkly asymmetric distribution of conflict between the two gold provinces illustrates the influence of population and infrastructure on predicting conflict incidence.

While mining does not strictly cause conflict, it increases its probability by providing both the motivation and means to engage in organized violence, particularly where governments cannot monopolize force in their territory. Without governance reforms– particularly in curbing corruption among SAEMAPE agents– South Kivu’s mineral wealth will remain a financial engine for armed groups and a source of unchecked environmental destruction.

Figure 7 – Interaction Effect of Roads & Mines on Estimated Conflict Exposure in South Kivu

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Figure 7 indicates a strong, nonlinear relationship between the presence of a road (in a given 10x10 km hex) and conflict risk near mines in South Kivu. A Generalized Additive Model¹³³ (GAM) helps adapt this nonlinear relationship to a regression model, suggesting road presence increases predicted conflict risk near mines by 2.57 points. This effect is most pronounced within 5 to 20 kilometers of mining sites. For road-connected mines, conflict declines as distance from a mine increases, underscoring infrastructure’s role in “activating” violence in locations with lootable commodities. Conversely, mines without main road linkages have far less influence on conflict risk because they are practically inaccessible by groups that might violently contest them. In other words, it is the interaction of multiple forces affecting conflict– in this case, road infrastructure and exploitable mining sites– rather than any single factor, that is responsible for driving violence in South Kivu.

Moreover, Figure 7 highlights how roads, particularly in areas of limited state reach, can serve as conflict multipliers where pre existing physical conditions like mineral presence create enduring incentives for violence. In South Kivu, infrastructure development does not guarantee stability; indeed, with limited government capacity to patrol or surveil, road networks can exacerbate security problems, rather than promoting effective state penetration.

Policy responses should focus on patrolling and monitoring road-accessible mining zones, especially within 20 kilometers. Recognizing that roads enable armed groups to reach and thus violently contest or exploit active sites means counterinsurgency efforts in South Kivu must prioritize securing South Kivu’s limited road network.

V. Policy Recommendations: Road Security, Surveillance & Reforming Incentive Structures

Improving security in South Kivu demands targeted responses that address the region’s intersecting challenges of conflict, resource exploitation, and limited infrastructure oversight. By focusing on areas where road networks, mining activity, and armed group presence overlap, interventions can disrupt key operational pathways while promoting civilian mobility and economic stability.

Prioritizing Spatial Areas for Intervention

Security efforts should target three high-risk zones in the province:

1. Road-connected mining zones within 5–10 km of mines: Areas around mining hubs frequently attract violence as the epicenter of economic mineral extraction incentives. These include Fizi’s eastern Lulenge (including Basimunyaka Sud and Minembwe) and southern Ngandja (Lulimba/Misisi) sectors, where a handful of villages suffer nearly 10% of the province’s total violence.
2. Inter-province roadways and cross-border routes: Key corridors between resources and population areas, such as the RN2 from Shabunda through Walungu and Mwenga, and the RN5 from Lulimba to Bukavu, require enhanced monitoring given their persistent role in enabling smuggling and militant movement. Establishing timber parks to consolidate logging shipments has proven¹³⁴ effective in increasing revenue capture and reducing armed group interference.
3. Remote forested road segments near known insurgent strongholds: Armed groups exploit multiple natural refuges in South Kivu, particularly the Hauts Plateaux¹³⁵, spanning the Itombwe Forest and Tanganyika (Fizi) sectors, and the Ruzizi Plain¹³⁶ (Uvira) along the DRC’s eastern border with Rwanda and Burundi. These clandestine areas enable¹³⁷ militia cross-border movements while providing bases to attack the province’s transit corridors in its middle and eastern belts. Strengthening state authority in these regions is crucial for curbing foreign interference in Congolese governance.

This targeted approach balances improved security with minimizing disruption to civilian movement and economic activity.

Low-Cost Road Surveillance Strategies

Effectively securing high-risk roadways involves focusing limited state resources on demonstrated conflict hotspots using cost-effective surveillance measures. The following strategies offer scalable, cost-effective methods to improve road security while minimizing disruption to civilian movement.

1. Expand drone surveillance to monitor road activity in real time: Deploying commercial-grade quadcopters from government or NGO hubs can provide cost-effective reconnaissance before security forces mobilize. Drones have already demonstrated robust¹³⁸ capacity for both surveillance and more offensive operations in the DRC.
2. Establish mobile checkpoints instead of static barricades: Rotating¹³⁹ patrols along key roadways increase unpredictability and reduce the ability of armed groups to anticipate and avoid security presence. Deploying temporary¹⁴⁰ roadblocks and integrating biometric¹⁴¹ verification at checkpoints can enhance security without requiring large deployments.
3. Leverage community watch networks to provide intelligence on road activity: Paying communities to use mobile reporting applications like eyeWitness¹⁴² can promote reporting of armed group movements. Offering these rewards to transport unions and informal traders can both improve early warning capabilities while incentivizing information sharing between citizens and the state.
4. Integrate security surveillance initiatives with existing health-oriented surveillance: Expand existing Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response¹⁴³ (IDSR) frameworks, designed to track public health threats like Ebola, to support security-related surveillance in the eastern DRC. IDSR’s focus¹⁴⁴ on outbreak identification and investigation, along with its community-based training, can support flexible, holistic monitoring of high-stress areas.

Figure 8 – Predicted Conflict Probability Models for South Kivu

!kivu_MC_LogReg_sideBySide.png

In Figure 8, both the Monte Carlo and logistic regression models indicate overlapping high-risk zones concentrated along key road networks and border regions in South Kivu. Each model incorporates a range of covariates, including conflict events, deforestation pixels, road proximity, mine proximity, population density, and displacement figures, to assess future conflict risk. While the Monte Carlo model emphasizes a broader distribution of conflict probabilities, the Logistic Regression model highlights more concentrated clusters of elevated risk. Notably, both models identify the same major corridors and settlement areas as primary conflict hotspots, reinforcing the persistent threat posed by road-enabled mining area access.

Modifying Incentive Structures

Corruption and the presence of armed actors in the DRC have fostered illicit incentive structures that undermine state revenue, fuel violence, and exploit civilians while accelerating environmental degradation. Addressing these incentives through targeted reforms and broad-based community participation can yield broader and more sustainable outcomes than focusing solely on their symptoms.

Expanding natural Protected Areas offers one effective strategy by increasing legal risks and on-the-ground oversight of unauthorized logging and land conversion. Strengthening these protections by allowing¹⁴⁵ local communities to engage in paid monitoring of PAs can safeguard ecosystems while encouraging communities and businesses to adopt sustainable practices. Timber parks¹⁴⁶, where communities can be similarly trained, have further shown encouraging effects on reducing smuggling and increasing state revenue capture.

Integrating community-based monitoring into REDD+¹⁴⁷ forest management programs further aligns incentives with sustainable development. Training residents to participate in data collection and surveillance ensures that those with intimate landscape knowledge play a key role in protecting it. Tying this involvement to financial benefits under REDD+ activities provides communities a substantive alternative to illegal activities while expanding access to conservation-focused livelihoods.

Lastly, participatory¹⁴⁸ due diligence practices involving civilians at artisanal gold mines have shown¹⁴⁹ promise in reducing official corruption and mitigating conflict financing. Rather than de facto embargoes of 3T and other Congolese mineral products, actively engaging communities around mining hubs in alternative, transparent traceability practices must be the focus of reform.

Strategic Implementation

Implementing these recommendations requires navigating South Kivu’s challenges of limited state capacity and persistent governance issues, where enforcement gaps and corruption frequently undermine security efforts. By combining technological solutions, community-driven intelligence, and international partnerships, these strategies aim to strengthen surveillance and deterrence without unduly burdening state forces.

Transparency measures, such as community-based monitoring of forests and mining sites, are essential to mitigating corruption, improving state capacity while ensuring resources are allocated effectively.

Focusing security efforts on consistently high-risk mining hubs and transit routes can effectively reinforce state control while hindering key operational channels for armed groups. Utilizing remote sensing, community networks, and adaptable road interventions provides a scalable strategy for enhancing security at South Kivu’s vital production and transport points without heavy troop deployments.

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Tim Klustner, MPP

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Notes

Footnotes

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2. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/24/fighting-in-eastern-drc-kills-about-7000-people-since-january-pm-says

3. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2489

4. https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/rwanda-m23-and-goma-deja-vu-198905

5. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/28/at-least-17-people-killed-as-fighting-in-dr-congos-goma-intensifies

6. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo

7. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2025/02/11/why-conflict-mineral-narratives-dont-explain-m23-rebellion-dr-congo

8. https://gsphub.eu/country-info/Democratic%20Republic%20of%20Congo#:~:text=Most%20of%20the%20raw%20mineral,and%20considerable%20amounts%20of%20cobalt.

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